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SYMBOLIC LOGIC: A RAZOR-EDGED TOOL FOR DRAFTING
AND INTERPRETING LEGAL DOCUMENTS
LAYMAN E. ALLENi-
A LARGE amount of the litigation based on written instruments-whether
statute, contract, will, conveyance or regulation--can be traced to the drafts-
man's failure to convey his meaning clearly. Frequently, of course, certain
items may purposely be left ambiguous, but often the question in issue is due
to an inadvertent ambiguity that could have been avoided had the draftsman
clearly expressed what he intended to say. In this Article it is suggested that
a new approach to drafting, using certain elementary notions of symbolic logic,
can go a long way towards eliminating such inadvertent ambiguity. This new
approach makes available to draftsmen a technique that achieves some of the
clarity, precision and efficiency of analysis that symbolic logic provides. In
addition, it can be a valuable aid in moving towards a more comprehensive
and systematic method of interpretation,' as well as drafting.
This approach is a compromise between expression in ordinary prose and
expression in the mathematical notation of symbolic logic-enough like ordi-
nary prose to be understood easily by any careful reader, enough like sym-
bolic logic to achieve some of its important advantages. It represents an
effort to adapt some of the techniques of symbolic logic to make more systematic
what is now best described as the "art" of drafting.
The first section will explain six elementary logical connectives: implication,
conjunction, coimplication, exclusive disjunction, inclusive disjunction and
negation. In order to simplify this exposition, trivial examples will be used
for purposes of illustration. In the second section the proposed system will
be applied to actual legal problems of drafting, interpretation, simplification
and comparison.
Six ELEMENTARY LoGICAL CONNECTIVES 2
1.0 Implication
The development of a more systematic method of drafting will enable the
lawyer to communicate his intended meaning more effectively. That is the
basic proposition to which this Article is addressed. This same proposition
can be stated in a different form:
tSocial Science Research Council Fellow, Yale Law School. Member Connecticut Bar.
1. The problem of interpretation is discussed in greater detail and the suggested
approach is illustrated with respect to several sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
in a forthcoming article.
2. A concise and clearly presented treatment of the six logical connectives examined
here may be found in FiTcE, SymRouic LoGIc: AN INTRODUCriON 9-63 (1952).
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If a more systematic method of
drafting can be developed, then the
lawyer will be able to communicate
his intended meaning more effectively.
This proposition is itself a compound proposition made up of two subsidiary
propositions :3
P. a more systematic method of
drafting can be developed
Q. the lawyer will be able to
communicate his intended meaning
more effectively.
These subsidiary propositions are linked together by the words "if . . .then
.... to form the compound proposition, which in abbreviated form would be:
If P, then Q.
This "if . . . then . . . ." relationship between two propositions is called
"implication," and is alternatively expressed as "P implies Q.,,4
In order to increase the clarity, precision and efficiency of thought,
symbolic logicians represent relations such as implication by symbols.
Although there is complete freedom in selecting these symbols, effective-
ness in thinking depends a great deal upon the system of notation that
is used.6 In this article a straight horizontal line " " will be
3. "Proposition" will be used here to refer to the intended meaning of a statement-its
idea content.
4. The logician would be careful to distinguish four different kinds of implication:
1. Logical: If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
2. Definitional: If Mr. Black is a bachelor, then Mr. Black is unmarried.
3. Causal: If blue litmus paper is placed in acid, then the litmus paper will turn red.
4. Decisional: If Mr. Smith parks overtime, then Mr. Smith commits a traffic
violation.
For the common core of meaning that is found in all four of these different kinds of implica-
tion, the logician has a special name: "material implication." CoPI, IN RoDucrIoN To LOGIC
229-36 (1953). Also, for some qualification of the use of "implies" to abbreviate "if ...
then . . .," see QUINE, MATHEMATICAL LOGiC 27-30 (1951).
5. For those who would like to test this assertion, it is suggested that they attempt
to solve the problem
742.96 divided by 13.463
out to three decimal places, using words, not numbers, to perform the operations. The
awkwardness of words as a means of describing the operations necessary to solve this
problem becomes readily apparent. The mastery of numerical symbols as a means of
manipulating quantitative relationships is a skill that everyone can recognize and appreciate.
It is, perhaps, less generally known that the symbolic logicians achieve similar success in
dealing with qualitative relationships.
6. Alfred North Whitehead, one of the foremost pioneers in symbolic logic, declares:
"[B]y the aid of symbolism, we can make transitions in reasoning almost mechanically by
the eye, which otherwise would call into play the higher faculties of the brain." WHITEHEAD,
AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICS 61 (1911). An illustration of what a difference nota-
(Vol. 66: 833
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The straight line will'also represent implication when the compound
proposition is written out in words:
1.2 1. A more systematic method of
drafting can be developed
2. THE LAWYER WILL BE ABLE TO
COMMUNICATE HIS INTENDED MEANING
MORE EFFECTIVELY.
All statements that involve an implication can be expressed in this form, here-
after called the "systematically-pulverized" form. 8
Most statements can be rearranged into the form of an implication without
a change in the meaning of the statement. For example, the sentence:
All statements that involve an implication
can be expressed in systematically-pulverized form
is equivalent to :9
IF a statement involves an implication, THEN
such a statement can be expressed in systematically-
pulverized form.
And where:
P = a statement involves an implication
Q = such a statement can be expressed in
systematically-pulverized form,
this same statement can be abbreviated by the schematic:
tion can make is given by Copi. He points out how easy it is to multiply 113 by 9 compared
with how difficult a task it is to multiply CXIII by IX. Copi, op. cit. supra note 4, at 220.
See also Jourdain, The Nature of Mathematics, in 1 THE WORLD OF MATHEMATICS 16
(Newman ed. 1956).
7. Strictly speaking from a logical viewpoint the straight line .. " will
represent material implication, the common core of meaning that is present in all the
various kinds of implication. See note 4 supra. For our purposes here, however, we can
consider " " as representing any of the different kinds of implication.
8. Why this name is appropriate will become apparent later. See p. 845 infra.
Appreciation should be acknowledged to Professor Harold D. Lasswell, who first suggested
calling it "creative-pulverization."
9. Symbolic logicians would use a universal quantifier to represent this:
(x) (IF x involves an implication, THEN x can be expressed in systematically-
pulverized form).
However, because most readers will not be familiar with quantifier theory, it will be more
convenient not to use quantifiers. The effect of the quantifiers will be achieved by the
wording of the proposition.




1.4 1. A statement involves an implication
2. SUCH A STATEMENT CAN BE
EXPRESSED IN SYSTEMATICALLY-
PULVERIZED FORM.
The process of transforming an ordinary statement into systematically-
pulverized form may be conveniently classified into four stages:
A. pulverizing the statement into its constituent elements,
B. rearranging the elements into approximately the form of an implication,
C. discovering the appropriate schematic form,
D. writing the statement in systematically-pulverized form.
A portion of section 397 of the Restatement of Contracts can serve to illustrate
this:
"A breach . . . of a promise by one party to a
bilateral contract, so material as to justify a
refusal of the other party to perform a contractual
duty, discharges that duty."
A. Pulverize into constituent elements:
P = a breach of a promise by one party to a
bilateral contract is so material as to
justify a refusal of the other party to
perform a contractual duty
Q = such a breach discharges that duty
B. Rearrange into the form of an implication:
IF a breach of a promise by one party to a
bilateral contract is so material as to justify
a refusal of the other party to perform a
contractual duty, THEN such a breach discharges
that duty.




D. Express in systematically-pulverized form:
1.6 1. A breach of a promise by one party
to a bilateral contract is so material
as to justify a refusal of the other
party to perform a contractual duty.
2. SUCH A BREACH DISCHARGES THAT DUTY.
The first of the two subsidiary propositions of an implication is called
the "antecedent"; the second, the "consequent." The consequent Q
results whenever the antecedent P prevails, or Q "follows" as a result
of P. In this Article, in order to differentiate them, the antecedent is
shown above the horizontal line and the consequent below. A final con-




Conjunction is the logical relationship between two subsidiary propositions
that are joined by the idea expressed by the word "and" in a statement such
as: "Roses are red AND violets are blue." In systematically-pulverized
form conjunction is indicated by the symbol "&."o All propositions that are













10. Notice.that this same idea is conveyed by many other English words, such as "but,"
"yet," "although," "however," "nevertheless," and "still." See Copi, op. cit. supra note
4, at 222-23.
11. This differs from the way two other connectives will be enumerated. See p. 847
infra.
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And conjunctive antecedents can imply conjunctive consequents:




An example of a single antecedent implying conjunctive consequents, as
in 2.2, is the following statement:
The consequent proposition of an
implication is written in capital
letters and is placed below the
horizontal line.
This is equivalent to:
IF a proposition is a consequent of an
implication, THEN that proposition is
written in capital letters AND that
proposition is placed below the horizontal
line.
And in systematically-pulverized form:
2.4 1. A proposition is a consequent of an
implication
2. THAT PROPOSITION IS WRITTEN
IN CAPITAL LETTERS
&3. THAT PROPOSITION IS PLACED BELOW
THE HORIZONTAL LINE.'2
12. Notice that 2.4 can be condensed even further by avoiding the repetition of the
words "THAT PROPOSITION IS" in the following manner:
2.4 1. A proposition is a consequent of
an implication
2. THAT PROPOSITION IS
1. WRITTEN IN CAPITAL LETTERS
&2. PLACED BELOW THE HORIZONTAL LINE





Hereafter, statements and schematic diagrams in systematically-pulverized form will be
condensed in this manner. This means that the symbol "&" (and the other symbols as well)
will be used to connect individuals and classes as well as propositions. Although this is a
departure from the practice of the symbolic logician who would use different symbols, it
should not create any difficulties because just what the items in such a connected list are
can easily be ascertained by examining them.
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
The schematic 2.2 is equivalent to, and merely represents a more concise
way of expressing, the pair of implications:
2.5 1. P1 & 2.6 1. P1
2. Q2
Because it represents one pair of simple implications, and one pair only, a
statement like 2.2 is still relatively specific and unambiguous even though
it is more complex than a simple implication. However, notice that a state-
ment with both conjunctive antecedents and conjunctive consequents like 2.3
does not have the specificity of more simple statements such as 2.1, 2.2, 2.5
and 2.6. A statement like 2.3 is more general, for it may represent any one





may be used to represent any one pair from among no less than twenty
different pairs of implications. For example, five of the twenty possible
pairs would be:
1- 1.0 1. P,
2. Q
2- 1.0 1. P
2. Q,
3- 1.0 1. P1
2. Q,
4- 1.0 1. P
2. Q=
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Which pair a statement like 2.3 is intended to indicate cannot be deter-
mined until the context in which the statement appears is examined. Some-
times that context will indicate rather specifically just which pair is intended;
other times the context will offer little guidance. The important thing for a
draftsman to realize is that the generality (ambiguity?) of a statement tends
to vary directly with its complexity, the addition of just a little complexity
being accompanied by the possibility of a great deal of ambiguity.'3
3.0 Coimplication
Coimplication can be defined as the conjunction of two particular implica-
tions-the coimplication of proposition P and proposition Q is the con-
junction of the implication "P IMPLIES Q" and the implication "NOT
P IMPLIES NOT Q." Since the implication "NOT P IMPLIES NOT
Q" is equivalent to the implication "Q IMPLIES P," the coimplication
"P COIMPLIES Q" can also be expressed as "P IMPLIES Q AND Q
IMPLIES P." Because coimplication is composed of two implications,
it is appropriate to represent coimplication in systematically-pulverized
form by two horizontal lines "...
In schematic form, the coimplication
3.1 3.2 3.3
1. P 1. P 1. NOT P
is equivalent to &
2. Q 2. Q 2. NOT Q
This, in turn, is the same as
3.1 3.2 3.4
1. P 1. P 1. Q
is equivalent to &
2. Q 2. Q 2. P
Furthermore, it should be apparent that
3.1 1. 1 3.5 1. Q
is equivalent to
2. Q 2. P
13. The potential importance of this to the legal draftsman is apparent. Ordinarily
when a draftsman wishes to express a statement that is broad and general in scope, he
does so by his choice of words. He may use words like "reasonable" and "seasonable" to
achieve generality and permit flexibility. Analysis of a statement like 2.3 shows rather
vividly an alternate possibility for achieving generality where desired. Variation in the
degree of generality expressed can be controlled by varying the complexity of the statement.
Furthermore, it may be possible to exercise more sensitive control over the degree of gener-
ality of a statement if it is done by varying complexity, rather than by varying choice
of words. A draftsman can clearly mark the limits that a statement is intended to cover
by indicating which pair of subsidiary propositions it expresses. The boundaries of word
categories cannot easily be so precisely defined. It may well be that the use of variation
in complexity as a supplementary means of achieving generality will furnish a technique
whereby the degree of generality of a statement can be more systematically and precisely
controlled. It would seem to merit further inquiry.
[Vol. 66:833
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An illustration of coimplication is easily constructed by making an addition
to a statement made earlier. Recall the statement:
IF a more systematic method of drafting can be
developed, THEN the lawyer will be able to communicate
his intended meaning more effectively.
Add to this the implication:
IF a more systematic method of drafting can NOT be
developed, THEN the lawyer will NOT be able to
communicate his intended meaning more effectively,
and the two statements together form a coimplication. The first statement is
expressed schematically in 3.2; the second, in 3.3. Together they form the
coimplication in 3.1. Notice that another way of saying the second state-
ment would be:
ONLY IF a more systematic method of drafting can
be developed will the lawyer be able to communicate
his intended meaning more effectively.
Hence, the two statements can be condensed into:
IF AND ONLY IF a more systematic method of drafting
can be developed, THEN the lawyer will be able to
communicate his intended meaning more effectively.
This, in turn, is equivalent to:
A more systematic method of drafting can be
developed IF AND ONLY IF the lawyer will be able to
communicate his intended meaning more effectively.
In systematically-pulverized form this would be:
3.6 1. A more systematic method of drafting can
be developed
2. THE LAWYER WILL BE ABLE TO COM-
MUNICATE HIS INTENDED MEANING
MORE EFFECTIVELY.
The following are equivalent ways of stating a coimplication like 3.1:
1. P COIMPLIES Q.
2. P IS EQUIVALENT TO Q.
3. P IMPLIES Q, AND Q IMPLIES P.
4. P IMPLIES Q, AND NOT P IMPLIES NOT Q.
5. IF P THEN Q, AND IF Q THEN P.
6. IF P THEN Q, AND IF NOT P THEN NOT Q.
19571
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In failing to make clear whether the relationship between two or more
parts of a statement is intended to be implication or coimplication, legis-
latures frequently create an unnecessary problem of statutory construc-
tion. Many statutory provisions are in a form similar to: "Legal conse-
quence Q will follow when the fact P is legally established." When re-
arranged, this forms the implication "IF P THEN Q." Courts faced
with construing a provision such as this could well hold, as they often
do, that it was the intent of the legislature to state only one of the
factual antecedents that imply the legal consequence Q, i.e., facts other
than P could logically be held to imply Q.
But just as often courts apply the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius," a rule of construction based on the assumption that in explicitly
stating what antecedent implies consequence Q, legislatures intend that
Q will follow only when the named fact P is established. In other words,
the implication "IF P THEN Q" is converted into the coimplication
"IF AND ONLY IF P THEN Q."
By expressing statutes in systematically-pulverized form, draftsmen
would be reminded to indicate explicitly the intended meaning of the
legislature. A statement of the form:
1. P
2. Q
would clearly indicate that an implication, and only an implication, was
intended. On the other hand, a statement of the form:
1. P
2. Q
would clearly indicate that a coimplication was intended. Of course,
in some situations the legislature intends to leave the relationship am-
biguous, open to interpretation as either implication or coimplication.
In those cases the form:
if P then Q
can be used to convey that meaning. Systematic pulverization will there-
by help assure that any ambiguity of this type included in a statement is
included intentionally and not inadvertently.
4.0 Exclusive Disjunction
Another prevalent source of ambiguity is the logical relationship called "dis-
junction." The difficulty, to a large degree, is that there are two separate
kinds of disjunction, and these are not always clearly distinguished. It is
important to realize that there are these two possibilities open: a disjunctive
statement is an exclusive disjunction or it is an inclusive disjunction.
(Vol. 66: 833
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
An exclusive disjunction is a statement that asserts the truth of one or the
other of its two subsidiary propositions, but not both. If it is assumed that no
statements are both exclusively and inclusively disjunctive, 14 then an example
of an exclusive disjunction is furnished in the last sentence in the previous
paragraph:
4.1 A disjunctive statement is an exclusive
disjunction, or it is an inclusive disjunction.
When rearranged into the form of an implication this statement becomes:
4.2 IF a statement is a disjunctive statement, THEN
that statement is an exclusive disjunction OR
it is an inclusive disjunction.






4.4 1. A statement is a disjunctive statement




14. This assumption is used only for illustration and is actually false according to
the customary definitions of exclusive and inclusive disjunction, i.e., the following truth table
definitions:
P Q P &OR Q P OR Q
T T True False
T F T T
F T T T
F F F F
These definitions show that all statements that are exclusively disjunctive are also inclusively
disjunctive. Therefore, it is false to assume that no statements are both inclusively and ex-
clusively disjunctive.
15. Notice that the enumeration of the subsidiary propositions of an exclusive disjunction
(1-, 2-, 3-, etc.) is different from the enumeration of the subsidiary propositions of a con-
junction (1., 2., 3., etc.). The subsidiary propositions of a disjunction can be referred to
as disjuncts. When the disjuncts are a single word or are very brief, it may be convenient
19571
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The symbol "OR" is used to indicate that the relationship between Q,
and Q2 is an exclusive disjunction. This symbol "OR" (and similarly "&OR"
for inclusive disjunction) has been selected so as to be clearly distinct from
the word "or," which is often used ambiguously to refer to both exclusive and
inclusive disjunction. It will be convenient to retain this common ambiguous
use of the word "or" in order to indicate a similar ambiguous relationship
when the draftsman does not wish to state the kind of disjunction intended.
The statement 4.1 is a good example of the ambiguous use of the word
"or." Often the context in which the word "or" appears will be helpful in
determining whether the "or" is intended to indicate exclusive disjunction
or inclusive disjunction. However, in this case the context is not very help-
ful. Unless the reader already has some notion of what is meant by "exclusive dis-
junction" and "inclusive disjunction," he does not know which 4.1 was in-
tended to mean:
1- A disjunctive statement is an exclusive
disjunction, or it is an inclusive
disjunction, but not both.
OR
2- A disjunctive statement is an exclusive
disjunction, or it is an inclusive
disjunction, or both.
The intended meaning of the sentence is the meaning expressed by the second
alternative, although, for purposes of illustrating exclusive disjunction, it was
assumed that the statement meant the first alternative. In other contexts
where the word "or" is used, its intended meaning is so clear from the context
that it is unnecessary to express one of the end-phrases "but not both" or "or
both." Thus, contexts vary in the extent to which they make clear the intended
meaning of logical connectives between the constitutent elements of a state-
ment. The explicit symbols of systematic-pulverization help to clarify the
intended meaning of such logical connectives in those contexts where the
meaning intended would not otherwise be clear.
In summary, (1) a statement of the form "P or Q" is intended to represent
an exclusive disjunction if, and only if, one, but not both, of its subsidiary
propositions is intended; and (2) a statement involving exclusive disjunction
will contain the symbol "OR" when expressed in systematically-pulverized
form. The transformation of the first statement in this summary into system-
atically-pulverized form is of interest, for it illustrates rather vividly the
appropriateness of the term "systematic pulverization." That statement is
readily recognized as a coimplication with the schematic form:
and may save space to omit the enumeration of the disjuncts. Thus, instead of being repre-
sented as in 4.3, an exclusive disjunction may be written:
Q1  OR Q2
in schematic form and accompanied by a similar modification in systematically-pulverized
form.
[Vol. 66: 833
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4.5 1. P
2. Q
In systematically-pulverized form it is:
4.6 1. A statement of the form "P or Q" is
intended to represent an exclusively
disjunctive relationship
2. ONE, BUT NOT BOTH, OF THAT STATEMENT'S
SUBSIDIARY PROPOSITIONS IS INTENDED.
Notice, however, that this coimplication statement can be further
"pulverized" into simpler elements, for some further relationships are
"hidden away" in the statement as expressed in 4.6. When proposition
P is examined carefully, it is seen that P COIMPLIES Q can be sepa-
rated into two subsidiary propositions, (1) P, and (2) P 2 COIMPLIES
Q, which are joined by implication. Thus, 4.4 is equivalent in meaning to
the implication:
4.7 IF a statement is of the form "P or
THEN such a statement is intended to represent
an exclusively disjunctive relationship IF AND
ONLY IF one, but NOT both, of that statement's
subsidiary propositions is intended.




Similarly, proposition Q can be separated into two subsidiary proposi-
tions, Q, and Q2, which are joined by conjunction. The statement:
One, but NOT both, of a statement's
subsidiary propositions is true
is equivalent in meaning to the conjunction:16
1. One of a statement's subsidiary
propositions is intended
&2. NOT both of a statement's subsidiary
propositions are intended.
16. This could be expressed in more condensed form as:
1. 1. One
&2. NOT both
of a statement's subsidiary propositions is true.
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If Q is also pulverized into its constituent elements the schematic form






This can be read in a variety of ways. For example:
1- IF P1, THEN P. IF AND ONLY IF Q1 AND Q2
2- IF P1, THEN P, COIMPLIES Q. AND Q2
In systematically-pulverized form the statement would be:
4.10 1. A statement is of the form "P or Q"
2. 1. that statement is intended to




OF THAT STATEMENT'S SUBSIDIARY
PROPOSITIONS IS INTENDED.
Just how far it will be appropriate to go in this process of pulverizing a
statement into more simple elements must be decided by the draftsman with
respect to each particular statement. At each stage further pulverization
may or may not enable him to communicate his intended meaning more effec-
tively. A draftsman must operate by intuition in arriving at what he thinks
will be the optimum degree of pulverization. The second statement in the
summary of exclusive disjunction illustrates this somewhat. When rearranged,
that statement declares:
4.11 IF a statement involves an exclusive disjunction,
THEN that statement will contain the symbol "OR"
when expressed in systematically-pulverized form.
In systematically-pulverized form:
4.12 1. A statement involves an exclusive disjunction
2. THAT STATEMENT WILL CONTAIN THE SYMBOL




It probably does not increase the communication of intended meaning to
pulverize further the consequent of 4.12 and thus express the whole statement
as:
4.13 1. A statement involves an exclusive disjunction
2. 1. That statement is expressed in
systematically-pulverized form
2. THAT STATEMENT WILL CONTAIN THE
SYMBOL "OR."
But this, of course, is a matter of judgment, to be exercised by the draftsman
in each particular case.
5.0 Inclusive Disjunction
An inclusive disjunction is a statement that asserts that one or the other,
or both, of its subsidiary propositions are true. The inclusively disjunctive
relationship will be denoted in systematically-pulverized form by the symbol
"&OR." The statement P &OR Q will mean:
P or Q or both,
and it will be systematically-pulverized as follows:
5.1 1) P
2) &OR Q
The enumeration of inclusive disjunctions is thus distinguished from that
of exclusive disjunctions and conjunctions:
EXCLUSIVE INCLUSIVE
CONJUNCTION DISJUNCTION DISJUNCTION
I. P I-P 1) P
&2. Q 'OR 2) &OR Q
2-Q
One additional observation should be made about disjunction. In 4.3 the
disjunctive propositions were consequent propositions. It is also possible for
either inclusive or exclusive disjunctions to appear as antecedent propositions,
as in:
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&5.3 1. 1) P1
2) &OR P2
2. Q
In conclusion and as a convenient reminder, the definition of an inclusive
disjunction will be expressed in systematically-pulverized form:
5.4 1. A statement is an inclusive disjunction






OF ITS SUBSIDIARY PROPOSITIONS ARE
TRUE.
6.0 Negation
Negation will be discussed here in one short paragraph. The negate
of this proposition is:
Negation will NOT be discussed here in one
short paragraph.
just as every positive number has a corresponding negative number, so every
proposition has a negate. Negation is involved in a statement whenever the
idea ordinarily expressed by the word "not" is present in that statement. For
example, a negation is involved in a statement such as:
The article is NOT biased.
Such a statement will often be equivalent in meaning to another statement
that does not explicitly contain a negation. For example:
The article is unbiased.
Whenever negation is expressed in systematically-pulverized form, it is gen-
erally preferable to use words like "NOT biased" rather than a word like
"unbiased," in order to emphasize the presence of negation. In systematic
pulverization the symbol "NOT" indicates negation.
7.0 Relationship Among the Six Logical Connectives
The six logical connectives described above are related to each other in a
variety of ways.' 7 For example, the following interrelationship of implica-




tion, conjunction, inclusive disjunction and negation can be logically demon-
strated to be always true :18
7.1. (A) 1. NOT
1. P
&2. Q
2. 1) NOT P
2) &OR NOT Q
To test this assertion let:
P = the reader is tired
Q = the reader is bored.
Then the antecedent of 7.1 (A) states any one of the three following
propositions:
1- The reader is NOT tired AND NOT bored
OR
2- The reader is tired AND NOT bored
OR
3- The reader is NOT tired AND bored.
It should be especially noted that a statement in the form of this ante-
cedent definitely leaves open the possibility that either of the last two
alternatives are the intended meaning of the statement. The consequent
of 7.1 (A) states:
The reader is NOT tired &OR NOT bored.
The whole statement in systematically-pulverized form would be:
7.1 (A) 1. The reader is NOT
1. tired
&2. bored
2. THE READER IS
1) NOT TIRED
2) &OR NOT BORED.
In ordinary prose the statement would assert the truism:
If the reader is either NOT tired AND
NOT bored, OR is tired AND NOT bored,
OR is NOT tired AND bored, THEN the
reader is NOT tired AND/OR NOT bored.
18. Fitch shows how readily this is done in symbolic logic. Compare his highly efficient
analysis in symbols with the illustration offered here in words. Representation in words is
markedly clumsy and awkward by comparison. The equivalences shown in 7.1 through 7.8
are known as De Morgan's Theorem. FiTcH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 60-62.
1957]
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Similarly, the converse of 7.1(A) is also a truism. In schematic form
it is:
7.1 (B) 1. 1) NOT P




The pair of implications 7.1(A) and 7.1(B) combine to form the co-
implication:
7.1 (A&B) 1. NOT
1. P
&2. Q
2. 1) NOT P
2) &OR NOT Q
This indicates that the antecedent is equivalent to the consequent; an
equivalent of the negation-conjunction proposition of the antecedent can
be expressed by a disjunction-negation proposition.
In a similar manner it can be shown that an equivalent of the negation-
conjunction antecedent can be expressed by an implication-negation
proposition. 9 This would show that the following coimplication is also
a truism:





Finally, it can similarly be shown that the equivalent of a disjunction-
negation antecedent can be expressed by an implication-negation propo-
siton:
7.1 (B&C) 1. 1) NOT P
2) &OR NOT Q
2. 1. P
2. NOTQ
19. In Fitch's system of logic the equivalence shown in 7.1 (A&C) can only be deduced
when the principle of excluded middle is satisfied, i.e., when the proposition is either true
or not true. This condition will be satisfied in all of the situations where it is suggested
that systematic pulverization be used.
(Vol. 66:833
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In a similar manner the following interrelationships between implica-
tion, conjunction, negation and inclusive disjunction can be logically








































































20. The reader can test these assertions by inserting hypothetical subsidiary propositions
of his own.
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This set of schematics indicates the relationships among five of the logical
connectives: implication, coimplication, conjunction, negation and inclusive
disjunction. The other connective, exclusive disjunction, can be shown to
be equivalent to an expression involving negation and coimplication:
7.9 1. 1- P
OR
2- Q




Expression in systematically-pulverized form also furnishes a conveni-
ently brief, but at the same time comprehensive, way to distinguish be-
tween inclusive disjunction and exclusive disjunction.
7.10 Inclusive Disjunction
1. P &OR Q
2. 1- P & NOT Q
OR








2. 1- P & NOT Q
OR









Because the process of systematic-pulverization presented here is an attempt
to strike a workable compromise between:
1. symbolic logic
&2. statements in the ordinary language of
the practicing lawyers
one of the guiding aims in formulating the systematically-pulverized form has
been to steer clear of unfamiliar symbols wherever possible. A reader does
not need to have a flair for mathematics to understand systematic-pulverization.
The symbol for implication " "' is the only one that will be new to
most readers. The symbols for the other connectives, "&," "&OR," "OR"
and "NOT," are already somewhat familiar; and "." can readily be
derived from "
8.0 Sumnmary
Before turning to some illustrative applications of systematic pulverization
to concrete legal problems in the second section, it will be useful to have
available a summary of the six logical connectives.
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Conjunction 1. The six logical connectives dealt The six logical connectives dealt
&2. with here are conjunction, ex- with here are
clusive disjunction, inclusive dis- 1. conjunction
junction, negation, implication &2. exclusive disjunction




Exclusive 1- A person either understands A person either




Inclusive 1) Exclusive disjunction and/or 1) Exclusive disjunction
disjunction 2) &OR inclusive disjunction may prove 2) &OR inclusive disjunction
tricky for a while, but one soon may prove tricky for a while,
learns to distinguish them. but one soon learns to distin-
guish them.
Negation NOT The explanation here should not The explanation here should
be hard to understand. NOT be hard to understand.
Implication 1. If a person can read, then he 1. A person can read
should be able to understand it
2. very easily. 2. HE SHOULD BE ABLE
TO UNDERSTAND IT
VERY EASILY.
Coimplication 1. If, and only if, a person can 1. A person can read
read, he should be able to under-







APPLICATION TO CONCRETE LEGAL PROBLEMS
By using systematic pulverization a draftsman can more exactly express
his intended meaning, so that those who must interpret and apply the instru-
ment need not speculate as much about probable intention. At the same time,
the draftsman will be alerted against the inadvertent inclusion of ambiguity,
which may lead to unnecessary litigation. Furthermore, in the interpretation
of instruments drafted in the traditional manner, systematic pulverization can
be used to discover the wide variety of possible interpretations that are logically
available. Both of these uses--drafting and interpretation--can be demon-
strated by reference to specific ambiguities in loosely drafted legal instruments.
9.0 Implication-Coimplication Ambiguity
An illustration of one of the most commonly overlooked ambiguities-
whether the connection between two elements of a statement is intended to
be implication or coimplication-is found in section 65 of the Uniform Sales
Act:
"Sec. 65 WHEN SELLER MAY RESCIND CONTRACT OR SALE
Where the goods have not been delivered to the buyer, and the buyer
has repudiated the contract to sell or sale, or has manifested his inability
to perform his obligations thereunder, or has committed a material breach
thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract or the sale by giving
notice of his election so to do to the buyer."
The essential idea in systematically-pulverizing a proposition like section 65
is to separate the statement into its constituent elements and then to determine
the appropriate logical relationships between them.21 One convenient
breakdown of section 65 is the following:
A = Where the goods have NOT been delivered to the buyer
B = the buyer has repudiated the contract to sell OR the sale
C = the buyer has manifested his inability to perform his obligations
thereunder
D = the buyer has committed a material breach thereof
E = the seller gives notice of his election to rescind to the buyer
F = THE SELLER MAY TOTALLY RESCIND THE CON-
TRACT OR SALE.
The context indicates that the ambiguous "or" connecting B, C and D
is an inclusive disjunction so that on its face the statute says:
9.1 1. A
&2. B &OR C &OR D
&3. E
4. F
21. This process works in a similar manner whether used to interpret a given state-
ment or to draft a new one.
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Section 65 clearly declares that if the other antecedents are satisfied then:
IF (E) the seller notifies,
THEN (F) the seller may rescind.
But does "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" apply to notification? m
If the other antecedents are satisfied, must the seller notify the buyer of
his intention before he can rescind, or are there other pathways open
for the seller to gain the right to rescind in addition to the one explicitly
expressed in section 65? If the expression of a seller's right to rescind
by way of notification is intended to exclude all other possibilities, then




B &OR C &OR D
3. 1. E
2. F
If the draftsman had been using systematic pulverization the question
of whether 9.1 or 9.2 was intended would have been brought to his at-
tention; he would have been reminded to indicate his choice between
them, if he desired to do so. On its face section 65 does not indicate
clearly which of these two interpretations was intended. For that matter,
there are six other possible ways of interpreting the logical relationships
between F and the other elements:
3. 1. B &OR
2. F
C &OR D




2. 1. B &OR C &OR
&2. E
3. F
22. The alternative route to a recission right for the seller indicated




in § 61 of the
to notification.
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&2. B &OR C &OR D
3. F
9.8 1. A
&2. B &OR C &OR D
&3. E
4. F
For a given statement the number of possible implication-coimplication
interpretations of the statement can be mathematically determined. Where the
number of antecedents in the statement = N, the number of possible interpre-
tations - 2 "' . In this case N = 3, so the number of possible interpretations =
2 = 8.
Thus, for what appears to be a relatively simple and straightforward statu-
tory passage, there are often a wide variety of possible interpretations. In
section 65 there are eight different combinations of implication and coimplica-
tion for a court to choose among. It is suggested that in many-but certainly
not all-such cases the consensus of the legislature would be embodied in just
one of the possible interpretations, and that ought to be specified dearly, rather
than expressed in the usual broad and ambiguous form. This example illus-
trates how systematic pulverization, by the questions it raises, can be used as
a tool to lead the legislature to express more clearly just what it does intend-
at least in those cases where it wishes to express a clear intention. It also
illustrates the usefulness of systematic pulverization for the advocate, who is
provided with a comprehensive and systematic reminder of all the possible
interpretations he might argue for his client.23
When section 65 is read in the light of section 53 (Remedies of an Unpaid
Seller) and section 61 (When and how the Seller May Rescind the Sale), the
23. Only the implication-coimplication ambiguity of § 65 has been considered here.
But it should also be apparent that all of the uses of the word "or" in the section are
ambiguous, and that the appropriate interpretation for each instance of its usage must be
determined.
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most reasonable interpretation of section 65 would seem to be 9.1. In syste-
matically-pulverized form this would be:
9.1 1. The goods have NOT been delivered to the buyer
&2. The buyer has
1) repudiated the contract to sell OR sale
2) &OR manifested his inability to perform
his obligations thereunder
3) &OR committed a material breach thereof
&3 the seller gives notice of his election to rescind
to the buyer
4. THE SELLER MAY TOTALLY RESCIND THE
CONTRACT OR THE SALE.
Courts are often faced with resolving ambiguities as to whether implication
or coimplication is intended in a statement.24 It is likely that systematic pul-
verization will help avoid some of the litigation built upon such ambiguity.
Resolving such ambiguity is not always an easy task, and judicial responses
do not follow a uniform rule in resolving it.25
10.0 Disjunctive-Conjunctive Ambiguity
In the construction of wills, courts that are called upon to give specific
meaning to the words "and" and "or" frequently substitute an "or" for an
"and," and vice versa, in order to achieve the apparent intent of the testator.2 0
But often the "plain meaning" of the words is held to foreclose any further
inquiry into the testator's intent. A classic instance of such strict interpretation
occurred in Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson,2 7 in which the House of
Lords was called upon to construe a residuary bequest to testator's executors
in trust
"for such charitable institution or institutions or other charitable or
benevolent object or objects ... as [his] . . . executors . . . may in their
absolute discretion select.
The important ambiguity was the word "or" used to connect the words "char-
itable" and "benevolent." It is a cardinal rule of English common law that
a man can not delegate his testamentary power. Lord Simonds explained that
there is only one exception to this rule:
24. See cases in Dac. DiG. Statutes key no. 195, "Express mention and implied
exclusion."
25. Three recent cases in Illinois illustrate how courtg find it appropriate to vacillate
between application and rejection of the implied exclusion rule. See Dick v. Roberts, 8
Ill. 2d 215, 133 N.E.2d 305 (1956) ; In re Leichtenberg's Estate, 7 Ill. 2d 545, 131 N.E.2d
487 (1956) ; Dilton v. Nathan, 10 Ill. App. 2d 289, 135 N.E.2d 136 (1956).
26. See cases in DEc. DIG. Statutes key no. 197, "Conjunctive and disjunctive words."
27. [1944] A.C. 341.
[Vol. 66:893
SYMBOLIC LOGIC
"A testator may validly leave it to his executors to determine what
charitable objects shall benefit, so long as charitable and no other objects
may benefit." 28
Since the "or" was interpreted by the majority of the Lords to indicate dis-
junction, the executors under the will would have been empowered to dis-
tribute to objects that were benevolent but not charitable, and the will was
thus held invalid. The rigidity of interpretation insisted upon in this decision
may seem undesirable to readers accustomed to the more flexible spirit of
most courts. Although such flexibility is clearly desirable to permit the achieve-
ment of justice in each particular case, it does enhance uncertainty, which
may, in turn, encourage litigation. 29 Interpretations of the "or" as either con-
junction (charitable AND benevolent) or as coimplication (charitable THAT
IS TO SAY benevolent) would have saved the will, because either of these
interpretations would require every distribution by the executor to be charit-
able.
This was clearly a will that would have been saved if the draftsman had
been using systematic pulverization. When he came to the troublesome "or"
between "charitable" and "benevolent," he would have been faced with a
specific choice in systematically pulverizing. He would have been forced to make
a decision to represent that "or" by one of the following five symbols:
1- "&" indicating conjunction,
2- "___ _ " indicating coimplication,
3- "&OR" indicating inclusive disjunction,
4- "OR" indicating exclusive disjunction,
5- "or" indicating that the draftsman wished to be ambiguous.
There is little doubt that if the draftsman had been faced with this choice, a
valid will would have been written by his specifying one of the first two
choices.ao In this fashion systematic pulverization provides the draftsman with
a reminder to scrutinize small but significant details more thoroughly.
28. Id. at 371.
29. In wills, for example, just how "and' or "or" will be interpreted is difficult to
predict. See 95 C.J.S. Wills § 613(b) (1957).
30. Goddard, L.J., voting to invalidate the will in the Court of Appeal, observed:
"For myself I cannot have any doubt that the draughtsman in this case fell into a trap,
because it is obvious that the [testator's] intention was to leave the money to charity
in the popular sense of the term, and, had it been pointed out to him when he said, 'I
want to leave it to charitable or benevolent objects,' 'well, if you use those words
the money will not go to charity but to your first cousins once removed' (of whose
existence he himself probably did not know) then, provided [that the testator]
was of sound mind and memory and understanding, there is not the least doubt ...
that he would have said, 'Cut out the word "benevolent". ."
In re Diplock, [1941] 1 Ch. 253, 267 (C.A.).
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11.0 Ambiguity of Reference
In addition to the ambiguity involved in interpreting which logical connec-
tives are intended, a second kind, ambiguity of reference, can also be mini-
mized by systematic pulverization. Statements that contain this kind of am-
biguity are called "amphibolous" by symbolic logicians.31 The ambigu-
ity arises out of a loose combination of words such that it is not clear
which word or phrase refers to which other word or phrase. A common
arithmetical example would be:
4+3X2= ?
Which is it: 10 or 14? In arithmetic such ambiguity can be clarified by the
use of parentheses:
4 + (3 X 2) 10
(4 + 3) X 2 =14
Systematic pulverization can clarify amphibolous statements in words in a
manner similar to the way that parentheses clarify amphibolous arithmetical
statements. For example, take the statement:
All law professors and students at Yale should have little trouble under-
standing this.
Who is it that should have little trouble understanding this? Is it
1- all law professors (throughout the world) and
(law) students at Yale
OR
2- all law professors (at Yale) and
(law) students at Yale
OR
3- all law professors (throughout the world) and
(all kinds of) students at Yale
OR
4- all law professors (at Yale) and
(all kinds of) students at Yale?
The statement is amphibolous because it does not dearly state which of the
four propositions is meant. However, in systematically-pulverized form the
meaning is indicated clearly by explicit changes in the form of the antecedent.
The first proposition would be:
1. A person is a law
1) professor
2) &OR student at Yale
2. THAT PERSON SHOULD HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE UN-
DERSTANDING THIS.








2. THAT PERSON SHOULD HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE
UNDERSTANDING THIS.
The third proposition:
1. A person is a
1) law professor
2) &OR student at Yale
2. THAT PERSON SHOULD HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE
UNDERSTANDING THIS.
The fourth proposition:




2. THAT PERSON SHOULD HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE
UNDERSTANDING THIS.
A concrete example of this kind of ambiguity in a legal context is found
in section 53 of the Uniform Sales Act:
"Sec. 53 Remedies of an Unpaid Seller
(1) Subject to the provisions of this act, notwithstanding that the
property in the goods may have passed to the buyer, the unpaid
seller of goods, as such, has-
(a) a lien on the goods or right to retain them for the
price while he is in possession of them. .. "
Suppose an unpaid seller of the goods does not have possession of them. Does
he have a lien on the goods? In other words, does the phrase "while he is in
possession of them" modify
1- both
A. "right to retain them for the price"
&B. "lien on the goods"
OR
2- only "right to retain them for a price"?
19571
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The probable intent is that it should modify both. In systematically-pulverized
form this would be clearly apparent:
11.1 1. There is an absence of provisions otherwise in this act
&2. whether OR NOT property in the goods has passed to
the buyer 3 2
&3. a person is an unpaid seller of goods
4. THAT PERSON HAS A
1) LIEN ON THE GOODS
2) &OR RIGHT TO ,RETAIN THEM FOR
THE PRICE
WHILE HE IS IN POSSESSION OF THEM.







2) &OR RIGHT TO RETAIN THEM FOR
THE PRICE WHILE HE IS IN
POSSESSION OF THEM.
Closer scrutiny will reveal that there is a coimplication in the consequent
of section 53 that is uncovered if the consequent is pulverized further. If the
phrase "while he is in possession of them" is intended to modify both "lien
on the goods" and "right to retain them," then the further pulverized conse-
quent would be:
11.3 1 .........
&2 . .,.°... .
&3°. ..... *..
4. 1. that person is in possession of the goods
2. THAT PERSON HAS A
1) LIEN ON THE GOODS
2) &OR RIGHT TO RETAIN THEM
FOR THE PRICE
32. Note that this antecedent does not have any logical relevance. It was in the
original statement for purposes of emphasis and serves only that same purpose here.
It could be omitted entirely without changing the meaning of the statement.
[Vol. 66: 833
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On the other hand, if it were intended that the phrase "while he is in possession
of them" should modify only "right to retain them," then the further pulverized
consequent would be:
11.4 1 . .........
.2, .... ....
4. THAT PERSON
1) HAS A LIEN ON THE GOODS
2) &OR 1. is in possession of the goods
2. HAS A RIGHT TO RETAIN THEM
FOR THE PRICE.
A second example illustrating ambiguity of reference in a concrete legal
context is found in section 1448 of the New York Civil Practice Act. The
relevant portion of that section states:
"Section 1448 Validity of Arbitration Contracts or Submissions
"..... [a] provision in a written contract between a labor organization...
and employer ... to settle by arbitration a controversy or controversies
... thereafter arising between the parties... shall... be valid...."
Does this section apply to labor-employer agreements for arbitration of
1- future disputes only
OR
2- both future disputes and present disputes?
As presently written it could be interpreted to apply to either. If the section
were expressed in systematically-pulverized form, the structure of the antece-
dent could remove all doubt. If it was intended to apply to arbitration agree-
ments for both future and present disputes, the section would read:
11.5 1. A provision is in a written contract between a labor organiza-
tion & employer to settle by arbitration
1) a controversy
2) &OR controversies thereafter arising
between the parties
2. THAT PROVISION SHALL BE VALID.




thereafter arising between the parties
2. .........
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12.0 Comparison
One other way in which systematic pulverization will be useful is for com-
paring statements, so that differences and similarities can be pinpointed. This
use can be illustrated by comparing the M'Naghten Rule with a proposed re-
placement suggested by Professor Jerome Hall in a recent article. 33 This par-
ticular example is fruitful for another reason also. It shows how an eminent
authority (such as Jerome Hall in criminal law) who is carefully drafting a
statement to express just exactly what he means about something in his own
special field can easily fall into an error of omission when expressing his thoughts
in ordinary prose. If the rule were expressed in systematically-pulverized form
such an error would be made sufficiently glaring that the possibility of its oc-
curence would be virtually eliminated.
In ordinary prose the two rules to be compared are expressed as follows:
The M'Naghten Rule
"The Jury ought to be told in all cases . . . that to establish a defense on
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. '34
Hall's Suggested Rule
"A crime is not committed by anyone who, because of a mental disease,
is unable to understand what he is doing and to control his conduct at the
time he commits a harm forbidden by criminal law. In deciding this ques-
tion with reference to the criminal conduct with which the defendant is
charged, the trier of facts should decide (1) whether because of mental
disease, the defendant lacked the capacity to understand the physical nature
and consequences of his conduct; and (2) whether, because of such disease,
the defendant lacked the capacity to realize that it was morally wrong to
commit the harm in question." 35
A convenient pulverization of the relevant portions of the M'Naghten
Rule into its component elements would be:
A, = It is clearly proved that the accused party was laboring
under such a defect of reason as NOT to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing at the time of committing
the act
B, = It is clearly proved that the accused party was laboring under
such a defect of reason that he did NOT know he was doing
what was wrong at the time of committing the act
C, = It is clearly proved that the defect of reason is from disease
of the inind
D, = A DEFENSE IS ESTABLISHED ON THE GROUND
OF INSANITY.
33. Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761 (1956).
34. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
35. Hall, supra note 33, at 781.
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In schematic form the M'Naghten Rule would be:







12.2 1. It is clearly proved that
1. the accused party was laboring under such
a defect of reason
1) as NOT to know the nature
& quality of the act he was
doing
2) &OR that he did NOT know
that he was doing what
was wrong
&2. at the time of committing the act
this defect of reason is from
disease of the mind
2. A DEFENSE IS ESTABLISHED ON THE GROUND
OF INSANITY.
The Hall Rule is somewhat more complex. It ultimately reaches a
similar result (or seemingly is intended to), but with modernized lan-
guage and in two stages. A convenient pulverization into component
elements would be:
A., = The trier of facts decides that the defendant lacked the
capacity to understand the physical nature and consquences of
his conduct at the time he committed a harm forbidden by the
criminal law
B. = The trier of facts decides that the defendant lacked the capacity
to realize that it was morally wrong to commit the harm in
question at the time he committed a harm forbidden by criminal
law
C = The trier of facts decides that this lack of capacity is because of
a mental disease
E - the defendant is unable-to understand what he is doing at the
time he commits a harm forbidden by criminal law
F the defendant is unable to control his conduct at the time he
commits a harm forbidden by criminal law
G = the defendant's inability to understand what he is doing & to
control his conduct is because of a mental disease
D, A CRIME CANNOT BE COMMITTED BY THAT DE-
FENDANT.
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The first part of the Hall Rule in schematic form would be:





In systematically-pulverized form this would be :36
12.4 1. The defendant is unable to
1. understand what he is doing
&2. control his conduct
at the time he commits a harm
forbidden by criminal law
&2. the defendant's inability to
understand what he is doing & to
control his conduct is because of
a mental disease
3. A CRIME CANNOT BE COMMITTED BY
THAT DEFENDANT
The second part of the Hall Rule is a little more tricky. The phrase,
"in deciding this question," apparently refers to whether E, F and G are
satisfied. Assuming this reference is so intended, then the second part of
the Hall Rule would be:










36. Although Hall does not explicitly so provide in the language used, he probably
intends this statement to be a coimplication, rather than merely an implication as shown.
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In systematically-pulverized form:
12.6 1. The trier of facts is to decide whether
1. the defendant is unable to
1. understand what he is doing
&2. control his conduct
at the time he commits a harm
forbidden by criminal law
&2. the defendant's inability to
understand what he is doing & to
control his conduct is because
of a mental disease
2. THE TRIER OF FACTS SHOULD DECIDE
WHETHER
1. THE DEFENDANT LACKED THE
CAPACITY TO
1. UNDERSTAND THE PHYSICAL
NATURE & CONSEQUENCES OF HIS
CONDUCT
&2. REALIZE THAT IT WAS MORALLY
WRONG TO COMMIT THE HARM IN
QUESTION
AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED A HARM
FORBIDDEN BY CRIMINAL LAW
&2. THIS LACK OF CAPACITY IS BECAUSE
OF A MENTAL DISEASE.
But when the trier of facts reaches decisions as to A., B., and C2,
then what? When the Hall Rule is systematically-pulverized, it becomes
apparent that its first and second parts go to the threshold of a modern-
ized version of the M'Naghten Rule, but that it does not explicitly state
a complete rule.
For example, suppose the trier of facts decides:
1. NOT A2  the defendant did NOT lack the capacity
to understand the physical nature and conse-
quences of his conduct at the time he com-
mitted a harm forbidden by criminal law
&2. B the defendant lacked the capacity to realize
that it was morally wrong to commit the
harm in question at the time he committed a
harm forbidden by criminal law.
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From such a set of decisions, to what conclusions does the Hall Rule lead in
regard to whether:
1. E the defendant is unable to understand what
he is doing at the time he commits a harm
forbidden by criminal law
&2. F the defendant is unable to control his conduct
at the time he commits a harm forbidden by
criminal law?
Or suppose that the trier of facts decides A. and NOT B2. Applying the
Hall Rule, what would this indicate about E and F? Or suppose that the
trier of facts decides
A. and B.
OR
NOT A. and NOT B2,
what does either of these indicate about E and F? It is suggested that
12.4 and 12.6 (the Hall Rule) do not expressly indicate anything about
E and F as a result of findings by the trier of facts on A2 and B2 . The
Hall Rule does not explicitly state what logical connection there is
between:
1. the findings of the trier of facts on whether the
defendant lacked the capacity to
A2 understand the physical nature &
consequences of his conduct
&B2 realize that it was morally wrong to
commit the harm in question
and whether
2. the defendant is unable to
E understand what he is doing
&F control his conduct.
For example, does either A. or B2 alone imply E and F, or are both re-
quired before E and F follow? The unstated connection must be read in
by the reader or trier of facts. Apparently the unarticulated proposition
that Professor Hall had in mind is the following:7
37. This is not necessarily the unarticulated proposition that Professor Hall had in
mind. For example, the.logical relationship between A. and B, may be "& "or "OR,"
instead of "&OR" as shown. It is suggested, however, that 12.7 is the most probable version












12.8 1. The trier of facts decides that
1. the defendant lacked the capacity to
1) understand the physical nature
& consequences of his conduct
2) &OR realize that it was morally wrong
to commit the harm in question
at the time he committed a harm
forbidden by criminal law
&2. this lack of capacity is because of
a mental disease
2. THE DEFENDANT IS UNABLE TO
1. UNDERSTAND WHAT HE IS DOING
&2. CONTROL HIS CONDUCT
AT THE TIME HE COMMITS A HARM FORBID-
DEN BY CRIMINAL LAW
&3. THE DEFENDANT'S INABILITY TO UNDER-
STAND WHAT HE IS DOING & TO CONTROL
HIS CONDUCT IS BECAUSE OF A MENTAL
DISEASE.
If it is assumed that 12.4 is intended to be a coimplication (as it probably
is), then given the propositions 12.4 and 12.8, it is possible to infer the
proposition: 38
38. The logical proof of this inference is a relatively simple one and is of the form:
IF P COIMPLIES Q (12.8) and Q COIMPLIES R (12.4),
THEN P COIMPLIES R (12.9).
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In systematically-pulverized form this would be:
12.10 1. The trier of facts decides that
1. the defendant lacked the capacity to
1) understand the physical nature
& consequences of his conduct
2) &OR realize that it was morally
wrong to commit the harm
in question
at the time he committed a harm
forbidden by the criminal law
&2. this lack of capacity is because of
a mental disease
2. A CRIME CANNOT BE COMMITTED BY THAT
DEFENDANT.
These transformations have at last put the Hall Rule in a form that can
readily be compared with the M'Naghten Rule. Notice the similarity of
their schematic representations:
12.1 1 ............. 12.9 1 . .........
1 ........... .. .........
1) A, 1) A2
2) &OR B1  2) &OR B2
&2. C, &2. C.
2. D" 2. D.
The comparison of the two rules in systematically-pulverized form would
be:
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12.2 THE M'NAGHTEN RULE
1. It is clearly proved that
1. the accused party was
laboring under such a
defect of reason










at the time of
committing the act
&2. this defect of reason is
from disease of the mind
2. A DEFENSE IS ESTAB-
LISHED ON THE GROUND
OF INSANITY.
When lined up in this manner,
clearly.
M'NAGHTEN
1. is clearly proved
2. accused party






S. what was wrong
9. act
10.-------
11. defect of reason
12. disease of the mind
13. defense is established
12.10 The HALL RULE

















at the time he committed a
harm forbidden by the
criminal law
&2. this lack of capacity is
because of a mental disease
2. A CRIME CANNOT BE COM-
MITTED BY THAT DEFEND-
ANT.
the changes in terminology stand out
HALL










10. forbidden by criminal law
11. lack of capacity
12. mental disease
13. a crime cannot be com-
mitted
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Such a comparison in systematically-pulverized form shows clearly just
to what extent the old rule has been modified in the construction of the
suggested new proposal; and, perhaps, enables the reader to evaluate
better the claimed advantages of the new rule.
13.0 Simplification
Another way in which systematic pulverization will be useful is simpli-
fying statements and making them more comprehensible. For example, statutes
frequently contain two widely separated implications that taken together express
a coimplication. In such cases systematic pulverization can alert the draftsman
to instances where the more simple and comprehensible single coimplication
can be used instead of a pair of implications. Sections 74 and 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 illustrate this:
"Section 74 Prizes and Awards
(a) General Rule-Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section
117 (relating to scholarships and fellowship grants), gross income
includes amounts received as prizes and awards.
(b) Exception-Gross income does not include amounts received as prizes
and awards made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable,
scientific, educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement, but only
if-
(1) the recipient was selected without any action on his part
to enter the contest or proceeding; and
(2) the recipient is not required to render substantial future
services as a condition to receiving the prize or award."
One convenient pulverization of section 74 into its constituent elements would
be the following:
A = it is otherwise provided in 13.4
B = it is otherwise provided in section 117
(relating to scholarship and fellowship grants)
C = amounts are received as prizes &OR awards









E = there was action on the part of the selected recipient to enter
the contest &OR proceeding
F = the recipient is required to render substantial future services
as a condition to receiving the prize &OR award




In schematic form section 74 would be represented by the following pair
of propositions:






3. 1. NOT E
&2. NOT F
3. NOT G
In systematically-pulverized form section 74 would be:
13.3 GENERAL RULE
1. It is NOT otherwise provided in 13.4
&2. it is NOT otherwise provided in section 117
(relating to scholarship and fellowship grants)
&3. amounts are received as prizes &OR awards
4. SUCH AMOUNTS ARE INCLUDED IN GROSS
INCOME.
13.4 EXCEPTION
1. Amounts are received as prizes &OR awards










3. 1. there was NOT any action on the part
of the selected recipient to enter the
contest &OR proceeding
&2. the recipient is NOT required to
render substantial future services
as a condition to receiving the prize
&OR award
3. SUCH AMOUNTS ARE NOT INCLUDED
IN GROSS INCOME.
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If the constituent elements of these two propositions are examined more
closely it is discovered that A is equivalent to the combination of D & NOT
E & NOT F. This, in turn, means that 13.1 and 13.2 taken together estab-
lish a coimplication between:
1. D
&2. NOT G








whenever the other conditions are satisfied. This, in turn, means that the
pair of propositions, 13.1 and 13.2, and a portion of section 117 can be
represented by the single proposition:
13.5 1. C
2. 1. 1) B







13.6 1. Amounts are received as prizes &OR awards
2. 1. 1) that amount qualifies for
exclusion in section 117 (relating
to scholarship and fellowship grants)
2) &OR 1. such prizes &OR awards are










&2. there was NOT any action on
the part of the selected
recipient to enter the contest
&OR proceeding
&3. the recipient is NOT required
to render substantial future
services as a condition to
receiving the prize &OR
award
2. SUCH AMOUNTS ARE NOT INCLUDED
IN GROSS INCOME.
Because the argument indicating the equivalence of proposition 13.6
to the pair of propositions, 13.3 and 13.4, and a portion of section 117 is
not spelled out completely,3 9 Table I has been constructed to convince
those who may be skeptical about this asserted equivalence. There are
32 possible combinations of the antecedent conditions C, B, D, E and F;
and Table I shows that for every one of the 32 possible combinations,
both 13.6, as expressed in systematically-pulverized form, and section
74 and a portion of section 117, as expressed in the Internal Revenue Code,
lead to the same conclusion about G (i.e., about whether the amount shall
be included in gross income).
39. The only reason for not doing so here is that it would be an extremely complex
analysis in words. In symbolic notation the proof of-this equivalence runs to approximately
100 steps.
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Table 1
N = NOT






1. NC, NB, ND, NE, NF
2. NC, NB, ND, NE, F
3. NC, NB, ND, E, NF
4. NC, NB, ND, E, F
5. NC, NB, D, NE, NF
6. NC, NB, D, NE, F
7. NC, NB, D, E, NF
8. NC, NB, D, E, F
9. NC, B, ND, NE, NF
10. NC, B, ND, NE, F
11. NC, B, ND, E, NF
12. NC, B, ND, E, F
13. NC, B, D, NE, NF
14. NC, B, D, NE, F
15. NC, B, D, E, NF
16. NC, B, D, E, F
17. C, NB, ND, NE, NF
18. C, NB, ND, NE, F
19. C, NB, ND, . E, NF
20. C, NB, ND, E, F
21. C, NB, D, NE, NF
22. C, NB, D, NE, F
23. C, NB, D, E, NF
24. C, NB, D, E, F
25. C, B, ND, NE, NF
26. C, B, ND, NE, F
27. C, B, ND, E, NF
28. C, B, ND, E, F
29. C, B, D, NE, NF
30. C, B, D, NE, F
31. C, B, D, E, NF
32. C, B, D, E, F
This should persuade even the most dubious that 13.6 is equivalent to sec-
tion 74 and the relevant portion of section 117 as they are now written in the
Internal Revenue Code. In both, every imaginable combination of relevant
[ol.66:I3N
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facts leads to the same conclusion about whether the amount is to be included
in gross income. Yet the systematically-pulverized form shown in 13.6 is a
distinct improvement in terms of simplicity and comprehension. And it can
be fairly assumed that many sections of the Internal Revenue Code-as well
as other statutes-are appropriate candidates for such simplification.
CONCLUSION
Although he regarded perfect drafting as unattainable, Justice Cardozo
recognized that:
"The task of judicial construction would be easier if statutes were invari-
ably drafted with unity of plan and precision of expression. Indeed, ad-
herence to the same standards would be useful also in opinions. '40
It might be that one of the consequences of such improvement in drafting
would be to enhance the role of the legislature in the determination of public
policy. Lest this is too remindful of past attacks on "judicial legislation" and
disappointed hopes for controlling the judiciary by codification, it is freely
acknowledged here that some form of judicial legislation is not only inevitable,
but also desirable. The important point that should be emphasized is that
judicial legislation arises from at least two different sources, only one of which
can be justifiably defended.
Judge Frank indicated this distinction in answering Bentham and his dis-
ciples on their criticism of the power exercised by judges in construing
statutes. 41 To Frank the failure in Europe of repeated attempts to destroy
judicial legislation through codification was significant. He regarded as a
"fatuous dream" the notions that all policy can come solely from the legisla-
ture-that legal certainty can be achieved by using codification to eliminate
judicial legislation. According to Frank, when courts interpret statutes, they
cannot avoid engaging in supplemental law making, for two reasons:
"[T]he necessary generality in the wording of many statutes, and in-
eptness in the drafting of others, frequently compels the courts, as best
they can, to fill in the gaps, an activity which, no matter how one may
label it, is in part legislative. '42
Few would dispute this contention. However, Frank's analysis becomes even
more interesting if carried further by pointing out one clear distinction
between:
1. the necessary generality in the wording of many statutes
&2. ineptitude in drafting.
40. Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382,392, 171
N.E. 479, 482 (1930).
41. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1944).
42. Id. at 621.
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Because of the first, the filling of gaps in legislation by courts cannot and
should not be entirely eliminated. However, this is not the case with judicial
legislation made necessary by ineptitude in drafting. The contention here is
that the necessity for judicial legislation should be minimized insofar as that
necessity arises from drafting ineptitude. This Article represents an effort
to devise techniques to curtail drafting ineptitude and the ambiguities thereby
created.
The technique of systematic pulverization is based on the proposition that
communication can be clarified by identifying and spotlighting the logical
connectives embodied in a message. This brief survey of six of the elementary
logical connectives suggests that the extent to which such clarification can be
achieved when the full apparatus of symbolic logic is used, may be quite im-
pressive, indeed. Even this initial application of symbolic logic provides signifi-
cant help in avoiding some of the pervasive problems of legal drafting and
interpretation.
Some of the potential virtues inherent in a more general application of
symbolic logic to legal thinking are likely to be found in systematic pulveriza-
tion. In a recent article Professor Ilmar Tamello has opened the door on
discussion of such a general application of symbolic logic as a tool for legal
analysis.43 Although he asserts more than he demonstrates and commits some
important technical errors,44 many of his observations deserve close scrutiny
and further investigation. His intuitions about the usefulness of symbolic
logic as a tool for legal analysis, which may well turn out to be sound, seem
pertinent enough to include here in detail. The following is a slightly para-
phrased summary of his observations:
(1) Logic in general can be used as a universal form of reference, an all-
embracing theory of scientific research to coordinate all of the different
disciplines.
(2) Symbolic logic is more exact and more comprehensive than traditional
logic.
(3) Even though traditional logic is more easily communicated in our
present state of learning because of its greater familiarity, nevertheless
symbolic logic is capable of more effective rational penetration.
(4) The increasing complexity of legal analysis, just as in any other disci-
pline, produces a greater need for the simplification and precision of
symbolic logic; and the tendency away from traditional logic is already
visible in philosophy, natural sciences and theoretical economy.
(5) Symbolic logic is not a new conception of law; it is not a source of ex-
perience, but only an intellectual tool to master human experience.
(6) Symbolic logic employed in legal thinking will not deny the role of intu-
43. Tamello, Sketch for a Symibolic Juristic Logic, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 277, 302-06 (1956).
See also Anderson & Moore, The Formal Analysis of Normative Concepts, 22 Am. Soc.
REv. 9 (1957).
44. Clark, On Mr. Tamello's Conception of Juristic Logic, 8 J. LEGAL Fa. 491 (1956).
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ition; there is room in legal thinking for both analytical and intuitive
approaches.
(7) Exponents of symbolic juristic logic are not seeking to promote legal
dogmatism by means of a "super logic"; on the contrary, they suggest
that it provides a logical means of penetration into the sociological
substratum of law, and excels traditional logic in doing so.
Recognizing that misunderstanding about the suggested use of symbolic
logic as a tool for legal analysis will, arise quite naturally, Tamello suggests:
"The still hazy outlines of a new province of knowledge emerging in the
field of our intellectual vision provide a ground onto which we naturally
tend to project our scholarly sympathies and antipathies, expectations
and apprehensions. Recognition of the fact that the projection
mechanism of our mind operates also in our scholarly pursuits should
permit us to be patient with new developments of learning until they
have had a chance to expose their true virtues and limitations. ' '45
A practical illustration of how symbolic logic can be employed in a legal
context was set forth more than six years ago in an article by John Pfeiffer,
in which he described the use of symbolic logic to rewrite a provision in a
contract of the Prudential Life Insurance Company. He stated:
"Symbolic logic has since been used in many other insurance problems.
Mathematicians at Equitable, Metropolitan, Aetna and other companies
have applied it to the analysis of war clauses and employee eligibility
under group contracts. And other corporations have found symbolic logic
very helpful in analyzing their contracts. Contracts between large corpora-
tions may run into many pages of fine print packed with stipulations, contin-
gencies and a maze of ifs, ands and buts. Are the clauses worded as simply
as they might be? Are there loop-holes or inconsistencies? A symbolic
analysis can readily answer such questions, and lawyers have begun to
call on mathematicians to go over their contracts. ' 46
To a profession whose most important skill is the manipulation of verbal
symbols, further inquiry would seem to be clearly warranted-inquiry into
the significance and relevance of this powerful analytic tool for purposes of
legal analysis. Its significance for drafting and interpretation alone ought to
be enough to justify serious consideration of including some formal instruction
in symbolic logic as part of law school training.
45. Tamello, supra note 43, at 304.
46. Pfeiffer, Symbolic Logic, Scientific American, Dec. 1950, pp. 22, 23, 24.
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